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Liberalism and Tolerance 

WILLIAM VOEGELI* 
Take the key terms quite literally, and a symposium on the relationship 
between liberalism and tolerance has no subject matter. 
“Liberalism” is, of course, a contested term.  Milton Friedman and Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr. disagreed about nearly every public policy, yet each
described himself as a liberal.  But whatever one’s understanding of liberty 
might be, making it an ism renders liberty, at least, an important political
consideration and, at most, the decisive one. 
The most straightforward, compelling way to make liberty important 
and unassailable is to anchor it in the concept of rights.  Liberty grounded 
in rights means that the person whose liberty has been curtailed or denied
suffers a violation rather than a mere disadvantage.  In the language of the 
Declaration of Independence, something inalienable has been taken from 
its rightful possessor, and the government that derives its just powers from 
the consent of the governed for the purpose of securing individuals’ rights 
has failed in its raison d’être. 
The noun tolerance, verb tolerate, and adjective tolerant made their
way into the English language 500 years ago from the French word tolération, 
which meant permission granted by authority.1  It, in turn, was derived 
from the Latin tolerare: to endure, bear, or suffer.2  Clearly, the idea of
* © 2017 William Voegeli. Ph.D., M.A. 1984, Loyola University, Chicago, Il.; 
B.S. 1975, Illinois State University.  He is a visiting scholar at the Henry Salvatori Center
at Claremont McKenna College, and a senior editor for the Claremont Review of Books
at the Claremont Institute.
 1. Toleration, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?

































   
 
 








liberty based on rights is antithetical to the notion of permission granted
by authority.  This would mean that tolerance is irrelevant to liberalism:
if Smith possesses a particular right, it makes no difference whether Jones
finds it enjoyable, endurable, or intolerable when Smith exercises that right.
In 1790 the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island wrote to
President George Washington, welcoming him to the city and praising him
as the chief official of a new government notable for “generously affording to
all Liberty of conscience, and immunities of Citizenship—deeming every 
one, of whatever Nation, tongue, or language equal parts of the great
governmental Machine.”3 The letter thanked God, and Washington, for
“all these Blessings of civil and religious liberty which we enjoy under an
equal and benign administration.”4 
In his famous reply, Washington graciously but pointedly called their
gratitude unnecessary.  Indeed, they got the key point exactly wrong: generosity
has nothing to do with this new government’s virtues.  Rather, 
It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of
one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural
rights. For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry
no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under 
its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all
occasions their effectual support.5 
Coming from that direction, the contention that there is no need to say
“Thank you” is magnanimous. From the other, the refusal to be grateful can 
be assertive or even truculent.  In the HBO series The Sopranos, Tony Soprano 
attempts at one point to placate Richie Aprile, an ex-convict who wants 
full and immediate restoration of the protection rackets and other illegal 
activities he controlled before he served his prison sentence.6  “You’re going
to be taken care of,” Tony says.7  “What was yours before you went away will
be yours again.  You just gotta give it some time.”8  This does not go over 
well. “What’s mine is not yours to give me,” Richie replies coldly.9 
If my rights are my rights, then they’re not yours, or the government’s, 
or anyone’s, to give to me or take from me.  How you or the government
feel about my rights and how I exercise them may be interesting, but it is 
3. Letter from Hebrew Congregation, Newport, Rhode Island, to George Washington, 
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not important.  Whether my rights present themselves as things others feel 
they must endure has no bearing on the demarcation or exercise of those 
rights.
The liberal thinkers who made the question of rights central offered
formulas for determining rights’ limits.  John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle”
from On Liberty states, “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.”10  This is perfectly congruent with Thomas 
Jefferson’s axiom in Notes on the State of Virginia: “The legitimate powers 
of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.  But it 
does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no
god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”11  As a colloquial expression 
of the same idea has it, “Your right to swing your arm ends where my nose 
begins.” 
Another path leading to the same destination emphasizes reciprocity 
rather than harm.  According to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, “each
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others.”12  Sorting out this mutually acceptable 
arrangement is likely to conclude with something indistinguishable from 
Mill’s harm principle.  No reasonable person, that is, would agree to let 
others, at their discretion and for their purposes, harm him, even a person
who could envision circumstances where he might wish to inflict harm on 
others. 
If we follow the logic and experience telling us that liberalism’s commitment 
to the primacy of freedom rests on the concept of inalienable rights, then 
we can formulate a null hypothesis: Adhering to liberalism’s standards,
and pursuing liberalism’s goals, has nothing to do with tolerance—not
with its presence or absence, nor with its quantity and quality. Under
liberalism, there are only two categories of intolerable acts: those that
inflict harm on others; and those that exercise power over a member of a
civilized community, against his will, for any reason other than to prevent
harm to others.  Following the logic of liberalism tells us that such acts
must be prevented, and all others must be permitted.  We stipulate this
distinction, and then adhere to it, not because tolerance is an inherently 
10. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Ticknor & Fields 2d ed. 1863) (1859). 
11. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 265 (1787).
12. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971). 
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admirable or important consideration, but simply as a logical consequence 
of the commitment to liberty. 
To cast doubt on this null hypothesis is to raise the possibility that the 
question of whether liberals can and should be tolerant is complex and
central, rather than easily settled and peripheral.  If the null hypothesis 
remains intact and formidable after being challenged, the best answer to
the question of whether liberals can and should be tolerant is, “Yes, of 
course.” To the extent, however, that the null hypothesis appears to give 
an incomplete, defective account of what is needed to make liberalism work
in theory and in practice, the answer changes to, “Yes . . . up to a point.”
The question then becomes what that point is, how to define and discern
it, and what we do when we’re at or near it. 
We may begin to call the null hypothesis into question by noting that
Mill qualifies the harm principle when he stipulates that it applies only to 
members of a civilized community, not to “those backward states of society 
in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.”13 
The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there 
is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit
of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end,
perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government 
in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means
justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application
to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of
being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them
but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate 
as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being
guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since
reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either
in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer 
admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of
others.14 
It follows that liberalism, the political disposition that insists on making 
the harm principle the fundamental rule guiding how government treats 
citizens and how they treat one another, has a prerequisite: liberalism can
work in nations that have arrived at that stage of development where people
can improve through free and equal discussion, but nowhere else. And
because the difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress that would
lead to that state of affairs are so great, liberalism rests on an awkward
paradox: the preconditions that make it possible are usually illiberal: a 
benevolent despot who uses any expedient that hastens the passage from 
13. MILL, supra note 10, at 24. 
14. Id. at 24–25. 
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barbarism to civilization.  This foundation for liberalism may be otherwise 
obtainable by some particular group of people, but may well not be.15 
This qualification of liberalism, in the terms Mill made it, does little to 
challenge the null hypothesis that tolerance isn’t all that important for
liberalism. He hastens to add that civilized nations, ones where people 
can be improved by reason and persuasion, are the only ones that concern
us when we address the question of how the harm principle can be made
operational.16 As Mill describes it, tolerance—the willingness to listen to 
viewpoints we find ridiculous or even pernicious on the chance that there
might be some benefit or enlightenment to be gained by doing so—is part 
of the civilizational package deal that makes liberalism possible.17 “The 
spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure it is right,” in Learned
Hand’s famous formulation.18  It is “the spirit which seeks to understand 
the minds of other men and women,” and that “weighs their interests alongside 
its own without bias.”19 
When people express foolish or dangerous ideas, the government officials
and citizens who disagree strongly should stand aside.  Even if we have 
no interest in accepting or acting on erroneous opinions, their full, free
expression is beneficial. Error itself makes truth clearer and more ascertainable. 
“He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that,” Mill 
elsewhere contends in On Liberty.20  If someone seeks to understand how
and why wrong ideas are wrong, “[h]e must be able to hear them from 
persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do
their very utmost for them.  He must know them in their most plausible 
and persuasive form.”21  Our intellectual immune systems will be weakened 
if excessive moral hygiene banishes dangerous or disdained ideas.  People
who have been spared the ordeal of encountering arguments they find
15. Note that according to this logic of historical development, there must be at 
least one portion of mankind that, as he would say, became civilized spontaneously.  That 
is, the people who were first civilized could not have had civilization imposed on them by
civilized despots: there weren’t any around. And since the historical record shows that 
there were several early civilizations in locations on the globe too distant from one another
to be overcome by early means of transport, it seems likely that more than one civilization 
developed without being improved by a conqueror. 
16. MILL, supra note 10, at 23. 
17. See id. at 47. 
18. Judge Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944), https://texashistory. 
unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth183520/m1/1/ [https://perma.cc/2XF2-TG96]. 
19. Id.
 20. MILL, supra note 10, at 71. 
21. Id. at 72. 
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absurd or obnoxious, Mill wrote, “have never thrown themselves into the 
mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered
what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any
proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess.”22 
Liberty and tolerance go together, then, because both are consequences 
of epistemological openness, curiosity, and humility.  This disposition, in 
turn, is the logical, necessary result of the commitment to reason that
differentiates civilized people from barbarians.  Liberals need to worry
about tolerance, it appears, only to the extent they worry about maintaining
liberalism’s civilizational prerequisite.
And, Mill strongly suggests, they don’t need to worry about it all that
much.  In his account, civilization and liberalism—free and equal discussion, 
improvement through persuasion, resorting to coercion for the sole purpose
of preventing harm to others—are very advantageous, agreeable modes of
life.23  Those nations that have made the difficult, dicey transition from 
barbarism to civilization are highly unlikely to climb back down voluntarily. 
There was a long, benighted barbarous era anterior to the attainment of 
civilization, but as soon as the civilizational prerequisite for liberalism is
attained, the harm principle becomes fully operational and morally mandatory.
Coercion for any reason other than preventing harm is “no longer admissible,”
implying it will never again be admissible, implying in turn that we may
expect the civilizational prerequisite of liberalism to go on and on, from 
strength to strength.24 
What if, however, civilization is not an irreversible attainment?  As the 
New Yorker’s Adam Gopnik has written, “Mill is like a man who has spent 
his life on one of those moving walkways you find in airports.  He takes 
the forward movement so much for granted that he never makes it his 
subject.”25 
Our null hypothesis, that tolerance is one of liberalism’s details rather 
than one of its central concerns, is not seriously challenged by the argument
that the preconditions for liberalism are not self-generating.26  Those
circumstances where illiberalism is merely pre-liberalism, as benevolent 
despots strive to civilize barbarous peoples, simply lie outside Mill’s field 
of inquiry.  If, however, civilization is not self-sustaining, then tolerance
becomes a large, urgent question, rather than a small, trivial one.  Liberal
 22. Id. at 72–73. 
23. See id. at 85. 
24. Id. at 25. 
25. Adam Gopnik, Right Again: The Passions of John Stuart Mill, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/06/right-again [https://perma.cc/ 
D2X6-BECP].
26. EVELYN WAUGH, THE ESSAYS, ARTICLES AND REVIEWS OF EVELYN WAUGH 625 
(Donat Gallagher ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1983)
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societies must now confront the possibility that the harm principle might
not perpetuate itself, and may even help extinguish itself, by undermining 
the civilization its operation presupposes. 
The case of Mill suggests there are good reasons why so many people 
use the political terms “liberal” and “progressive” interchangeably.  Liberals
believe in progress because they believe in a virtuous circle: freedom promotes
progress, and progress promotes freedom.  As the quality of life improves,
and the sources of and occasions for conflict diminish, people are left
increasingly amenable to further improvement through reason and persuasion. 
In turn, reasoning people see how life has been improved by free discourse 
and inquiry, and knowing these benefits they wish to preserve and expand 
freedom in the expectation of securing even greater benefits in the future. 
The hallmark of the conservatism that stands athwart liberalism and
progressivism yelling, “Stop!” is the conviction that the civilizational 
prerequisites of liberalism are not self-perpetuating: not always; not necessarily;
not usually; and, quite probably, not ever.  In 1964 Evelyn Waugh reviewed
two biographies of Rudyard Kipling, whom he described as “a conservative 
in the sense that he believed civilization to be something laboriously
achieved which was only precariously defended.  He wanted to see the defences
fully manned and he hated the liberals because he thought them gullible 
and feeble, believing in the easy perfectibility of man and ready to abandon
the work of centuries for sentimental qualms.”27 
The beliefs Waugh discerned in Kipling were ones he had expressed in 
his own voice twenty-five years previously.  “I believe,” he wrote in his 
“Conservative Manifesto,” “that the anarchic elements in society are so 
strong that it is a whole-time task to keep the peace.”28  He was profoundly 
skeptical of the idea that the airport walkway that took us from barbarism
to civilization will simply keep going forward forever, either because it
cannot be stopped or reversed, or because no one would wish to.29  To the
contrary, “Civilization has no force of its own beyond what is given it
from within. It is under constant assault and it takes most of the energies 
of civilized man to keep going at all.”30  By the same token, “Barbarism
is never finally defeated; given propitious circumstances, men and women 
who seem quite orderly will commit every conceivable atrocity.”31 Thus, 
27. Id.
 28. Id. at 161. 
29. Id. at 161–62. 
30. Id. at 161. 
31. Id. at 162. 
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without “unremitting effort” we risk “the dissolution . . . of the spiritual 
and material achievements of our history.”32 
Mill and Waugh’s arguments do not allow us to simply reject the null
hypothesis, which holds that tolerance is a trivial consideration for liberalism,
a system of ideas and government that will function satisfactorily as long
as people adhere to such rules as the harm principle and reciprocally
establishing rights’ extent.  It is possible, however, that Mill’s discussion 
of liberalism’s civilizational prerequisites, combined with Waugh’s arguments
about civilization’s inherent fragility, raise serious questions about
the null hypothesis.  If barbarism is humankind’s default option so that it
requires unremitting effort both to establish and maintain civilization, then 
the question of tolerance may be important and central to the fate of a 
liberal order that presupposes civilization. Mill’s stipulation raises a possibility
he does not engage: a civilized community may find it advisable to exercise
power against some of its members, not only to prevent harm to others,
but also—sometimes, under some circumstances—because failing to exercise 
such power will permit the community to become uncivilized, or insufficiently
civilized, so that reason and persuasion can no longer guide public life.  It
may be, in these circumstances, that the illiberalism required to civilize 
barbarians, and make liberalism possible, is also required to make liberalism 
tenable, either by maintaining or restoring the prerequisites liberalism rests
on.
There is a second, related difficulty.  The civilized communities liberalism
presupposes must be both civilized and communities.  Mill treats barbarism 
and civilization as properties of “the race itself” or “mankind.”33  No Akbar
or Charlemagne ever presided at once over all mankind, so their efforts to
make people amenable to reason and persuasion applied only to that portion 
of mankind they ruled at any one time.  This formulation suggests that 
barbarous peoples are more barbarous than they are peoples and, conversely,
that communities do not become real communities until they are civilized. 
Barbarians, on this view, are held together in particular social groupings 
only by force, which increases the likelihood that their bonds are artificial,
weak, and meaningless.  The bonds uniting a civilized community, by contrast,
are ones forged and modified by people capable of being improved by free 
and equal discussion, which increases the likelihood that the bonds are
genuine, sturdy, and meaningful.
If all this is true, then the sturdiness of civilization is inextricably bound 
up with the sturdiness of civilized communities.  Those who have known 
the advantages that come from relying on reason, and on limiting coercion 
32. Id.
 33. MILL, supra note 10, at 24–25.
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to the stringent terms of the harm principle, will have a strong desire to 
remain civilized and grow more civilized.  And those communities held 
together by bonds freely chosen by reasonable people, will want to maintain
and strengthen those bonds. 
There are, however, historical and anthropological reasons to doubt that
the inertial cohesiveness of sincere, reasoning, civilized communities is
true.  Tribalism—Us and Them—has always been a powerful force in human 
affairs.  It long predates the Enlightenment, or any older, more general
commitment to the power and excellence of reason, such as the emergence
of philosophy in ancient Greece.  Akbar and Charlemagne did not conquer 
and consolidate on behalf of reason, but out of a complicated mix of motives,
revealed religion being prominent among them.  Making people reasoners 
was subordinate to making them believers.  More precisely, reasoning worthy
of the name was not understood to exist apart from or in opposition to 
believing in the true, revealed faith. 
The forces that hold communities together, then, are much more numerous
and complex than a commitment to reason for the sake of reason, or for the
sake of the benefits it brings. And this more complicated set of motives 
and aspirations holding communities together admits the possibility of a 
community being more fragile than Mill suggests.  The power of reason may 
not be enough to sustain it. Some people may reason themselves out of the 
ties that connect them to a community.  Other people, as a result of immigration 
without assimilation, or voluntary estrangement, may find themselves situated 
in but not members of the community.
Under these circumstances, again, a prerequisite for liberalism may
prove so tenuous that it is jeopardized by the operation of liberalism.  Ideas, 
beliefs, words, and actions that do not harm anyone, but do threaten the 
community’s cohesion or even existence may be intolerable.  The community
that does nothing to oppose and curtail them may find itself a dissolving
or dissolved community, unable to make liberalism function. 
Consider the Netherlands, described by Dutch writer (but American resident) 
Ian Buruma as “an oasis of tolerance, a kind of Berkeley writ large, where
people were free to do their own thing.”34  In 2004, filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh was murdered on the streets of Amsterdam by an assailant who shot
him several times, then cut his throat from ear to ear with a knife, which 
34. Ian Buruma, Final Cut: After a Filmmaker’s Murder, the Dutch Creed of Tolerance 
Has Come Under Siege, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2005/01/03/final-cut-2 [https://perma.cc/R3CY-CVSX].
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he then used to affix a letter to Van Gogh’s lifeless body.35  The letter 
made clear that the murderer, Mohammed Bouyeri, a second-generation
Moroccan immigrant, was infuriated by Submission, Van Gogh’s documentary
movie about the abuse of women by devout Muslims.36  Bouyeri appears 
to have acted alone, but his cause was not the private mission of a solitary 
lunatic.37  Buruma reports that for many weeks after the crime, “young men 
of Moroccan origin . . . cheered as they passed the spot of the filmmaker’s 
death.”38  One told a television interviewer that Van Gogh’s violent end 
was just; he had been punished by God.39 
At the time of the murder, about one tenth of the Netherlands population 
consisted of first-generation immigrants, mostly from Turkey, Surinam,
and northern Africa.40  Immigrants and their children were only partially 
integrated into Dutch society, and much of the separation was by mutual 
choice.41  After Van Gogh’s death, Paul Scheffer, one of the country’s most 
influential liberal public intellectuals wrote, 
Segregation in the big cities is growing, and this is very bad news. That is why
the soothing talk of diversity and dialogue, of respect and reason, no longer works.
Tolerance can survive only within clear limits. Without shared norms about the 
rule of law, we cannot productively have differences of opinion.42 
To insist on the importance of shared norms is to second the motion that
liberalism both requires community and cannot take it for granted.  The 
feasibility of ordering a society so that compulsion is used for the sole 
purpose of preventing harm to others presupposes a robust, widely shared
ethic of self-restraint and mutual respect.  One of Chicago’s official mottos 
is, “I will.” The legendary columnist Mike Royko, nemesis of the Richard 
J. Daley political machine, always insisted, however, that the corrupt 
city’s real motto was, “I will . . . if no one’s looking.”  Liberalism has a Ring
of Gyges problem.  The police cannot be everywhere.  If many citizens’ 
consciences are so atrophied or twisted that they are prepared to attempt 
any transgression so long as no one’s looking, limited government is 
going to have to be aggressively augmented, and will wind up being
indistinguishable from unlimited government. 
It appears, then, that resorting to compulsion for the sole purpose of
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Preventing harm could mean arranging for a police officer to forcefully
thwart the commission of violence.  No society has been wealthy enough 
to provide every citizen with a personal security entourage, however.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Van Gogh’s collaborator on Submission, had round-the­
clock police protection for a time after his murder, since she also received
numerous death threats about the film.  One reason Hirsi Ali eventually
moved to the United States was resentment, popular and governmental, 
about the expense and trouble of protecting her.
Ordinarily, then, prevention means not personal security forces for all,
but a system of law enforcement, courts, and correctional institutions.  A 
robust criminal justice system will deter even the citizen afflicted with
abysmally weak impulse control, who will come to understand that the risks 
entailed by picking his neighbor’s pocket or breaking his leg outweigh the
rewards. A society bolstered by shared norms against theft and violence
can thrive with a relatively modest criminal justice system, while one
where such norms have broken down or never formed will risk descending 
into a war of all against all, no matter how many police stations, courthouses, 
and prisons it builds.
On December 31, 2015, hundreds of German women, out celebrating
New Year’s Eve in Cologne and other cities, were surrounded by large 
groups of men, who groped and, in some cases, stripped and raped them.43 
The authorities determined that the assailants were young men from North 
Africa, living in Germany as refugees, asylum seekers, or illegal immigrants.44 
Because immigration was already politically controversial, the police and
press attempted at first to downplay the scope of the attacks.45  One British 
newspaper columnist, Joan Smith, later insisted that while the Cologne 
story was distressing, it vindicated neither opposition to large-scale immigration
from the Middle East to Europe, nor pessimism about the subsequent
assimilation of migrants.  “It would be naïve to assume that men with 
unacceptable attitudes towards women will undergo an instant change of
heart on arriving in countries with a commitment to gender equality” she 
wrote.46
 43. Joan Smith, Cologne New Year Sex Assaults Are a Wake-Up Call: All Women

































Remarkably, however, Smith thought it was not naïve to expect that 
“the problem can be managed through education and a direct challenge to
views which are inherently sexist, or homophobic.  If we can teach refugees 
English or German, we can also teach them about the importance of equality 
and human rights.”47  This optimism rests on the belief that shared norms, 
arduously forged over long centuries in highly specific cultural contexts, 
can be easily imparted to those whose socialization has formed radically
different moral sensibilities.  A few brightly colored brochures and some 
well-organized orientation sessions for the earnest, receptive students will get 
everybody on the same page.  Clearly, one danger of life in a liberal society, 
where the worth and nobility of free and equal discussion is considered self-
evident, is that this congenial experience renders incomprehensible those 
who scorn rather than welcome such discussion.  According to some reports, 
Theo van Gogh’s pleas to his assailant in the course of the lethal attack
included, “Surely we can talk about this.”48 
Shared norms about respecting reason and persuasion are neither necessarily 
nor most reliably imparted, sustained, and strengthened by reason and
persuasion. People cannot be persuaded to let themselves be persuaded: 
they must first be disposed to think more highly of free and equal discussion
than of resorting to force. A liberal society must be especially concerned
about factors, sociological and ideological, that would instead leave people
more favorably disposed to satisfying their appetites, advancing their interests,
or resolving their differences by force and fraud instead of by reason. The
sociological factors include the weakening of intermediary structures— 
families, interconnecting networks of friends, religious and civic organizations, 
voluntary associations of various kinds—which inculcate and nourish shared 
understandings about acceptable and unacceptable conduct.  The ideological 
ones involve advocacy of the position that certain beliefs are too important 
to be left to full and free discussion, but must be asserted by any means 
necessary. Mohammed Bouyeri, it appears, was not a thug or psychotic, but
a fanatic who killed Van Gogh in the belief that Islam was being defamed.
The assassins at the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo magazine, who killed to 
protest the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad, had similar motives. 
On the basis of all these considerations, it is now possible to state a
challenge to our null hypothesis.  Liberalism cannot thrive or even endure 
if liberals attempt to institute it in a society that is not: (a) civilized, in 
Mill’s sense of being amenable and devoted to full, equal discussion; 
(b) cohesive, in the sense that the members of the polity feel a strong attachment 
to it, their fellow citizens, and certain basic, distinctive precepts; and that 
47. Id.
 48. Buruma, supra note 34. 
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does not (c) manifest this civilization and cohesion in the habits, dispositions,
and day-to-day lives of the great majority of citizens.  Because liberalism 
is so dependent on these prerequisites, the question of tolerance is a
serious, difficult one for liberalism, not an easy one that can be dispatched
simply by invoking the basic tenets of the liberal project.  If, as Scheffer
wrote after the Van Gogh murder, “Tolerance can survive only within clear 
limits,” then the viability of liberalism may depend on maintaining or restoring 
those limits.  Under those circumstances, the best liberal—the one whose
words, deeds, and decisions do the most to uphold and the least to imperil 
the effort to preserve and fortify liberalism—may be one who is willing 
to violate liberalism’s rules, rather than one who insists on adhering to them 
categorically.49  The best liberal, that is, will show statesmanlike flexibility
about exercising power over members of a civilized community against their
will.  Compulsion may be a better choice than tolerant acquiescence if their
words, deeds, and beliefs jeopardize liberalism’s prerequisites, even though 
they don’t directly harm or threaten other members of the community.  By contrast,
the orthodox liberal who insists on adhering to liberal strictures under all 
circumstances, regardless of the consequences, may be so rigidly doctrinaire 
as to facilitate the destruction of the clear limits without which tolerance 
and liberalism cannot survive.
Unpacking the position of those liberals resolutely opposed to qualifying
the harm principle for the sake of maintaining or reestablishing the prerequisites
that make liberalism possible yields two possibilities.  Some take the 
position that, in theory, there could be circumstances where the preservation 
of liberalism was better served by curtailing liberalism than by adhering 
to all its principles, fully and strictly.  It’s just that no concrete situation
ever seems so dire to them as to justify using compulsion against anyone 
for any purpose other than to prevent harm to others. 
Others take a more categorical, romantic position: it is preferable, if 
worse comes to worst, for liberalism to succumb to difficulties beyond
liberals’ control than for it to be diminished by compromises within their 
control. The logic here is that if liberals start making concessions about 
fundamental principles in response to one tangible threat to liberalism’s 
prerequisites, they will put the whole liberal project on a slippery slope. 
Liberalism’s enemies will keep finding other dangers that call for other 
curtailments, and will keep pointing back to the concession liberals agreed
to as a precedent validating new compromises.  If liberalism’s destiny is
 49. Id.
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to become extinct, liberals should at least refuse to be actively complicit 
in its demise.
The position of those willing to curtail liberty—to use compulsion not
just to prevent harm to others’ persons and property, but sometimes to
uphold civilization, community, or shared norms—is more complicated. 
As their stance is not categorical, their approach is necessarily prudential.
No formula can usefully define the circumstances where it’s best to curtail 
liberty; the world’s complexity defeats all efforts at writing recipes for
good governance.  “The only way a man can remain consistent amid changing
circumstances is to change with them while preserving the same dominating 
purpose,” Winston Churchill once wrote.50  “A Statesman should always
try to do what he believes is best in the long view for his country, and he 
should not be dissuaded from so acting by having to divorce himself from 
a great body of doctrine to which he formerly sincerely adhered.”51 
That the statesmanship Churchill recommends is flexible does not mean
it is random, improvised, simply tactical, or fundamentally amoral.  While 
never more than tentatively attached to a body of doctrine, it is directed
by a dominating purpose, an understanding of the country’s best interests 
in the long term.  Different statesmen will have different dominating purposes, 
but the various conceptions about the national interest are not so idiosyncratic
as to preclude efforts to make helpful generalizations.  There are, I believe,
four main dispositions regarding liberalism and tolerance, each offering a 
distinct framework for considering the question of when to curtail liberty
for the sake of upholding civilization, community, or shared norms.  The 
four are: pre-modern conservatism, modern conservatism, modern liberalism,
and post-modern liberalism. 
Conservatism, as both the word itself and Evelyn Waugh’s account of
it suggest, is dominated by a sense of precariousness.  One formula holds
that liberals think politics is about making the world a better place, while 
conservatives think the whole point is to keep it from becoming even worse.
By pre-modern conservatives I mean those who reject all the thinking 
about individual liberty, inalienable rights, equality before the law, government
by consent of the governed, separation of church and state, and the 
sovereign dignity of the private conscience that liberals, in the broadest 
sense of the term, treat as self-evident truths.  This position, sometimes
called throne-and-altar conservatism, was explicated most ably by Joseph 
50. CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONS 513 (Richard 
Langworth ed., 2008).
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de Maistre, the eloquent, erudite defender of absolute monarchy and papal 
supremacy. 
The pre-modern conservative does not fault Mill for saying that 
civilization is a prerequisite for liberalism, but thinks he is wrong to imply 
that civilization is valuable primarily because it makes liberalism possible. 
In fact, civilization is much more important than liberalism, which means 
barbarism is much worse than absolute rule.  The pre-modern conservative 
does not, therefore, wrestle with the question of whether and when to curtail 
liberalism for the sake of preserving liberalism.  Simply preserving civilization 
is always ample justification for curtailing liberalism.
Further, the pre-modern conservative strongly suspects that liberalism,
a product of such Enlightenment ideas as the belief in science, reason, and 
progress, poses a grave threat to civilization, which requires certainty and 
force to keep people in line. This type of conservative is, therefore, energetic
rather than reluctant and conflicted about restricting liberalism.  He agrees 
with Mill that despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing
with barbarians.  The problem is that barbarism is not a phase of human
history, but the defining attribute of human nature. All men are barbarians,
some a bit less so than others at any given moment, but none decidedly or 
irreversibly.  It isn’t just primitive illiterates in mud huts who require an
Akbar or a Charlemagne to avert chaos and ghastly atrocities, but all people
in all times and places.  That predicate of liberalism, the acquisition by a 
significant portion of mankind of the capacity to be improved by free and
equal discussion, will never arrive. 
Many liberals believe that all conservatives are pre-modern conservatives, 
pretending to have made their peace with modernity but deep down—so 
deep down they may never admit or even realize it—remaining opposed 
to the whole modern project.  According to political scientist Corey Robin,
all conservatives, from Edmund Burke to John Calhoun to Ronald Reagan
to Rush Limbaugh, are united and animated by “a genuine conviction that 
a world . . . emancipated will be ugly, brutish, base, and dull.  It will lack
the excellence of a world where the better man commands the worse.”52 
If we try to understand conservatives as they understand themselves, 
however, the counter-revolution against modernity has been abandoned. 
The purpose of conservatism is not to make liberalism go away—it won’t, 
ever—but to save it and civilization from liberalism’s worst tendencies 
52. COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE
TO SARAH PALIN 13 (2011). 
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and defects. At the beginning of Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville 
announces that its subject is the “great democratic revolution . . . taking 
place among us,” and makes clear that he is not one of those who “still
hope to be able to stop it.” Rather, he considers it “irresistible,” the “most 
continuous, the oldest, and the most permanent fact known in history.”53 
If we take modern conservatives at their word that they want liberalism 
to succeed as much as liberals do, the dispute between them is prudential, 
not theoretical.  Conservatives are deeply impressed by the frailty of liberal
institutions, while liberals are deeply impressed by their durability.  Justice
Robert Jackson wrote in his dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago
that “a little practical wisdom” was needed to prevent the Bill of Rights
from becoming “a suicide pact.”54  Five Supreme Court justices ruled that
Chicago’s breach-of-the-peace ordinance violated Arthur Terminiello’s
right to free speech, even though his inflammatory remarks did indeed
catalyze a public disturbance.  They did not, we may safely assume, think 
the Constitution is or should be a suicide pact. Rather, they concluded
that letting Terminiello speak without the city’s interference was a lesser 
threat to liberty and public order than curtailing his right to speak. 
In 1863 President Lincoln defended the arrest and military trial of Arthur
Vallandigham, an Ohio politician who was speaking against the Union
cause. The arrest was made, Lincoln wrote, because Vallandigham was
“laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage 
desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate 
military force to suppress it.”55  These efforts were “damaging the army, 
upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends.”56 
As he had done in many courtroom arguments, Lincoln posed and answered
a question to frame the issue in a way favoring his side of the case.  “Must 
I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch 
a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?” the president asked. 
“I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not 
only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.”57 
Lincoln allows that the grave peril posed by the Civil War alters the 
equation: the government is permitted to take certain actions in “cases of
rebellion or invasion” that would be unwarranted and impermissible in
other circumstances.  In 1861 he had made a similar argument to defend 
53. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
54.  Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949). 
55. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, to Erastus Corning and Others
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his suspension of habeas corpus protections in the aftermath of the attack 
on Fort Sumter.  Lincoln also, in that case, made his best points by posing 
questions. One was specific: “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, 
and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”58  Two
others were more philosophical: “Is there, in all republics, this inherent,
and fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for
the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”59 
Taking office in 1801, a time of national tensions but not a crisis as 
severe as civil war, President Thomas Jefferson took a more confident
view about a government too weak to maintain its own existence.  “If there 
be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its 
republican form,” he said in his first inaugural address, “let them stand 
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may
be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it.”60  The Constitution is
not a suicide pact in this view because: (a) so few among us have politically
suicidal tendencies; and (b) so many more are reasonable and would undertake 
an aggressive intervention for the sake of suicide prevention. 
The fact that 60 years later it took an astounding civil war to prevent 
the republic’s suicide, argues that Jefferson may have been over-confident
about tolerating error of opinion.  The liberal who takes the position that 
errors undermining liberalism’s prerequisites become intolerable only
when the dangers they create become large and imminent, runs the risk of 
responding too late to every threat.  On the other side of the spectrum, the 
vigilant liberal inclined to err on the side of caution by intervening to
suppress every expression or social trend capable of undermining liberalism,
may constitute a greater threat to liberalism than any of the dangers he 
acts to thwart.  The next Ice Age will probably begin with a blizzard, but 
most blizzards are just blizzards, not the beginning of a new Ice Age.
Generalizing broadly, modern conservatives are, as we have noted,
more disposed to intervene to prevent liberalism—in the broadest sense
of the term—from succumbing to its distinctive proclivities and vulnerabilities.
Modern liberals are more disposed to adhere strictly to the provisions of 
58. Id.
59. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Message to Congress in Special Session (July
4, 1861), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/message-to-congress-in­
special-session/ [https://perma.cc/6TS6-8UHZ].
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the harm principle, confident or at least hopeful that the freedoms it confers
will reinforce rather than undermine liberalism.  “I have never yet heard 
of a girl being ruined by a book,” said New York legislator—and later
mayor—Jimmy Walker, in opposing a “Clean Books Bill.”  Liberals endorse
this application of the harm principle, while conservatives worry about 
complacently putting a nation’s moral prerequisites at risk.  Those who 
believe that people can be improved by books, even as they can be improved
by free and equal discussion, should not be so certain that they cannot also 
be worsened by books.
This generalization explains just so much about our politics. It is
complicated by the fact that conservatives and liberals have different dominating
purposes, in Churchill’s sense of the term—different conceptions of the 
nation’s long-term best interests—so will disagree about what sort of
threats to the viability of liberalism are intolerable—indeed, whether certain
“threats” are even threatening.  Conservatives, for example, are especially 
concerned about the rights to acquire, hold, and voluntarily exchange
property, while liberals are especially concerned about the government’s 
ability to promote economic opportunity and security, as well as the people’s
ability to pursue this goal through the political process. Conservatives, as 
a result, view most liberal proposals for regulating campaign finance as
serious curtailments of fundamental civil liberties for the sake of slight,
dubious social benefits.  Liberals regard the same regulations as effecting 
trivial reductions in the freedom of speech for the sake of vital political
and policy benefits. 
We have noted that liberalism and progressivism are often used
synonymously.  The direct, commonsensical understanding of progress
is that it means getting closer to some goal, which is both comprehensible 
and clearly better than the current state of affairs. The ism of progressivism 
was, at first, a belief that understanding the laws of history would move
mankind to a better future, just as understanding the laws of nature had 
improved the human condition through technologies like the steam engine
and anesthesia. Condorcet asserted that there is “a science that can foresee
the progress of humankind, direct it, and accelerate it.”61 
Post-modern liberalism simultaneously enlarges and jettisons this notion.
Progress cannot mean getting closer to a defined goal, because progressivism
really means accepting that our standards of what it means to progress, to 
get better, will constantly change.  As William James wrote in Pragmatism, 
61. James W. Ceaser, True Blue vs. Deep Red: The Ideas that Move American Politics 
9 (2006), http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1254/ceaser2006_ 
bradley_symposium.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV99-C5VX].
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“‘The true’ . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the
right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.”62 
The post-modern liberal rejects the modern liberalism of John Stuart 
Mill, with his stipulations that liberalism can work only among the civilized,
and that barbarians need to be made civilized, however roughly, before 
they’re prepared for and worthy of liberalism.  That whole distinction between
civilization and barbarism strikes the post-modern liberal as morally repugnant
and intellectually untenable.  The “denial of universal principles,” according 
to historian James Kloppenberg, is the essence of “anti-foundationalism,” 
another term for post-modernism.  “[H]uman cultures are human constructions; 
different people exhibit different forms of behavior because they cherish 
different values.”63  Charlemagne and Akbar were neither better nor worse
than the people they subjugated and “civilized,” just different, especially
in the sense of being more powerful.  If the battlefield results had been 
otherwise, the “barbarians” would have been the ones “civilizing”—imposing 
their values upon—the “civilized.” 
The post-modern perspective would seem to make tolerance a non-
problem, both in general and for liberalism in particular.  No idea should 
be suppressed, because no idea is any better or worse, any more or less 
dangerous, than any other.  And if an idea, habit, or disposition turns out 
to be inimical to liberalism . . . well, who’s to say that liberalism is such great
shakes?  It, too, is just one more human construction based on values that 
are neither better nor worse than any other values. 
In practice, however, post-modernism has proven more conducive to 
legitimizing intolerance than tolerance.  The proliferation of campus
speech codes and rules against micro-aggressions testify to this development. 
Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is that if “the true” and “the 
right” are merely the expedient, they are held up as standards only because
some groups have prevailed over other groups.  Groups that dislike those 
standards, and dislike their position vis-à-vis the dominant groups, have 
every reason to reject and resist them by any means necessary.  To put the
point another way, the capability Mill calls for of being improved by free 
and equal discussion cannot be taken seriously in social circumstances 
where some are markedly less free and less equal than others.  Where such
 62. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 
222 (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909) (1907), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5116/5116­
h/5116-h.htm [https://perma.cc/757C-UCTF].
63. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, READING OBAMA: DREAMS, HOPE, AND THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL TRADITION 79 (2011). 
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disparities obtain, the less free and unequal should feel no obligation to
tolerate ideas, habits, or dispositions that perpetuate or compound their 
disadvantages. 
Post-modern liberalism, then, aggressively reinterprets the harm principle.
Even if you don’t pick my pocket or break my leg, you harm me if you
hurt my feelings, especially if you do so in a way that diminishes my sense
of self-worth by reinforcing existing status and power disparities.  One of 
the first campus speech codes attempted to ban “inappropriately directed
laughter” and the “conspicuous exclusion of students from conversations.”
Post-modern liberalism’s feasibility and coherence is highly doubtful. 
For one thing, the Van Gogh murder, Cologne sexual assaults, and Charlie 
Hebdo massacre call into question the possibility of a stable, effective 
coalition of the disadvantaged.  Feminists and Islamists, for example, are 
likely to be too busy fighting one another to join forces against the oppressors 
who are, purportedly, their real nemesis.
More generally, if “the right” is merely expedient, then history’s subjugators 
did not commit any transgression.  They just won. Those who have inherited 
the privileges those winners made possible have no more right to perpetuate
their advantages than those who want to redress the imbalances that have
come down to the present day—but they also have no less.  This view of
things reverses Clausewitz’s famous dictum: politics is now simply war 
carried out by other means.
I began by raising the possibility that tolerance is minor issue, having 
no bearing on whether liberalism works out or makes sense.  I conclude 
by noting that it is a central question, for liberalism and politics in general.
Tolerance is important because intolerance is important.  “Anything Goes” is
one of Cole Porter’s best songs, but is unlikely to become any country’s
national anthem.  The questions of what doesn’t go, and why, and how to 
prevent it from going any further, explain a great deal about the political 
ideologies of our era, as well as the premises on which social orders in
other times and places have been based. 
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